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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Three decades ago, the Supreme Court held in Meritor Savings Bank 
v. Vinson that workplace harassment was an actionable form of 
discrimination prohibited by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1  
Vinson offered hope that workplace discrimination would one day be 
eradicated.2  However, taking one look across newspapers, televisions, 
social media, and magazines will tell you that we still have a long way to 
go.3  Charges of employment discrimination have been at the forefront of 
media over the last year.4  On October 15, 2017, following a flood of over 
fifty accusations against Hollywood producer Harvey Weinstein, the 
social media platform Twitter began to buzz after actress Alyssa Milano 
tweeted, “If you’ve been sexually harassed or assaulted write ‘me too’ as 
a reply to this tweet.”5  In response, women across the platform began to 
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 1.   Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66–67 (1986). 
 2.   See Al Kamen, Court Rules Firms May Be Liable for Sexual Harassment, WASH. POST (June 
20, 1986), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1986/06/20/court-rules-firms-may-be-
liable-for-sexual-harassment/83ecaae2-74c7-4bea-8d9e-12b7e0023ef7/?utm_term=.7137f85f6b67 
[https://perma.cc/ZD7Z-U2CU] (illustrating hopeful remarks from organizations that fight workplace 
sexual harassment following the Vinson decision, including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce General 
Counsel and the National Organization for Women). 
 3.   See Alix Langone, #MeToo and Time’s Up Founders Explain the Difference Between the 2 
Movements – and How They’re Alike, TIME (Mar. 8, 2018), http://time.com/5189945/whats-the-
difference-between-the-metoo-and-times-up-movements/ [https://perma.cc/WC27-NYYC] 
(identifying key points in various recent sexual harassment movements). 
 4.   Fiza Pirani, #MeToo: A Timeline of 2018’s Sexual Harassment Scandals, ATLANTA J. & 
CONST. (May 25, 2018), https://www.ajc.com/news/national/metoo-timeline-2018-sexual-
harassment-scandals/Lv8ftAS6o0EMSdmqfo2R1L/ [https://perma.cc/8M9D-CTTZ] (outlining the 
multitude of media-worthy events).  
 5.   Alyssa Milano (@Alyssa_Milano), TWITTER (Oct. 15, 2017, 1:21 PM), 
https://twitter.com/Alyssa_Milano/status/919659438700670976/photo/1?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw&ref
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share their stories of similar experiences of inappropriate—and often 
illegal—behavior.  Socially powerful women, including Hollywood stars 
and Olympic gold medalists, shared their stories and identified prominent 
men who had committed these acts.6  The #MeToo movement7 sparked an 
immediate reaction to the pervasive presence—and in many cases 
tolerance—of sexual harassment and discrimination in the professional, 
political, and legal environments.8 
Roughly half of women in the workforce say they have personally 
experienced unwanted sexual advances at work.9  An even larger 
percentage identify sex discrimination and harassment as a serious issue.10  
Despite this fact, statistics show that nearly 75% of women who 
experience workplace harassment and discrimination do not report it.11  As 
the number of allegations continue to surface, it has become clear that a 
common factor keeps these individuals from speaking up—fear.12  This is 
                                                          
_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nytimes.com%2F2017%2F10%2F16%2Ftechnology%2Fmetoo-
twitter-facebook.html [https://perma.cc/28UA-HC63].  See, e.g., Heidi Stevens, #MeToo Campaign 
Proves Scope of Sexual Harassment, Flaw in Mayim Bialik’s Op-ed, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 16, 2017), 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/lifestyles/stevens/ct-life-stevens-monday-me-too-mayim-bialik-
1016-story.html [https://perma.cc/6GLS-HW8D]; Harvey Weinstein Scandal: Who Has Accused Him 
of What?, BBC (Jan. 10, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/entertainment-arts-41580010 
[https://perma.cc/PW8B-NTDU].  
 6.   Richard Winton et al., McKayla Maroney Accuses USOC and USA Gymnastics of Covering 
Up Sexual Abuse With Secret Settlement, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.latimes.com/ 
local/lanow/la-me-maroney-gynnastics-settlement-20171220-story.html [https://perma.cc/4RPH-
QUSK]; Helaine Olen, Sexual Harassment Does Not Occur in a Vacuum, THE NATION (Dec. 4, 2017), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/sexual-harassment-does-not-occur-in-a-vacuum/ [https://perma.cc 
/ELY4-ZU75]. 
 7.   This Note will refer to the #MeToo movement and “me too” evidence.  The #MeToo 
movement involves the social political changes involving sexual harassment and discrimination that 
was started by outcry from prominent women.  “Me too” evidence is the term used to describe 
testimony from similarly situated employees in suits involving harassment and discrimination. 
 8.   Mary Pflum, A Year Ago, Alyssa Milano Started a Conversation About #MeToo. These 
Women Replied, NBC NEWS (Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/year-ago-
alyssa-milano-started-conversation-about-metoo-these-women-n920246 [https://perma.cc/PEV9-
NBD6] (characterizing the aftermath of Milano’s “Me Too” tweet and the subsequent #MeToo 
movement). 
 9.   See, e.g., Caitlin Gibson & Emily Guskin, A Majority of Americans Now Say that Sexual 
Harassment is a “Serious Problem”, WASH. POST (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com 
/lifestyle/style/a-majority-of-americans-now-say-that-sexual-harassment-is-a-serious-problem/2017/ 
10/16/707e6b74-b290-11e7-9e58-e6288544af98_story.html?utm_term=.dd3eceaf19a8 
[https://perma.cc/5LNM-4ESC]; Ellen Brickman & Chad Lackey, Perceptions of Discrimination and 
Harassment in a #MeToo World: Implications for Litigating Employment Cases, DOAR RES. CTR. 8 
(2018), https://www.doar.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Perceptions-Of-Discrimination-And-
Harassment-In-A-MeToo-World.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q7D4-N63E]. 
 10.   See Gibson & Guskin, supra note 9. 
 11.   Chai R. Feldblum & Victoria A. Lipnic, Report of the Co-Chairs of the Select Task Force 
on the Study of Harassment in the Workplace, EEOC (2016), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/ 
task_force/harassment/report.cfm [https://perma.cc/EEP9-QDZD]. 
 12.   See Brickman & Lackey, supra note 9, at 10. 
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especially true for people with multiple (commonly known as 
“intersecting”13) minority identities who fear that breaking their silence 
could mean loss of employment, physical violence, or social 
ostracization.14  People who possess these multiple intersecting identities 
experience a compounded pressure to keep quiet in fear of retaliatory 
measures.15  The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 
has identified the significance of this power imbalance between employers 
and employees.  This “quid pro quo” harassment, as coined by the EEOC, 
forces women to endure harassment or discrimination simply out of fear 
of termination.16  Sexual harassment is not limited to unwanted sexualized 
behavior, but also includes the unchecked power imbalances present in 
workplace dynamics.17  This power imbalance permeates Hollywood, 
universities, law firms, and factories—pervading both the highest and 
lowest economic positions in our society.18  The creation of the #MeToo 
movement gave these victims an outlet to acknowledge collective patterns 
of inappropriate behavior without forcing a victim to shoulder the risk in 
isolation. 
Now, almost three years later, the #MeToo movement is still bringing 
                                                          
 13.   Intersectionality can be described as the predicament of “double discrimination” people 
experience when they possess multiple marginalizing characteristics such as race, class, gender, or 
sexuality.  Intersectionality is sometimes experienced as the compounded experience of both 
characteristics, while other times, the intersection of two marginalized characteristics create a wholly 
new category of experience that is unique to that particular intersection.  See generally Julia S. Seng, 
Marginalized Identities, Discrimination Burden, and Mental Health: Empirical exploration of an 
interpersonal-level approach to modeling intersectionality, 75 SOCIAL SCIENCE & MEDICINE 2437 
(2012).  See, e.g., D. Wendy Greene, Black Women Can’t Have Blonde Hair in the Workplace, 14 J. 
GENDER, RACE & JUST. 405 (2011) (describing the unique experience of being a Black woman in the 
workplace as well as the historical and social implications of race and gender). 
 14.   Stephanie Zacharek, Eliana Dockterman & Haley Sweetland Edwards, TIME Person of the 
Year 2017: The Silence Breakers, TIME (last visited Apr. 1, 2019), http://time.com/time-person-of-
the-year-2017-silence-breakers/ [https://perma.cc/32WM-NVUG]; Serena Mayeri, Intersectionality 
and Title VII: A Brief (Pre-)History, 95 B.U. L. REV. 713, 727–32 (2015). 
 15.   Dulini Fernando & Ajnesh Prasad, How Managers, Coworkers, and HR Pressure Women to 
Stay Silent About Harassment, HARV. BUS. REV. (July 13, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/07/how-
managers-coworkers-and-hr-pressure-women-to-stay-silent-about-harassment [https://perma.cc/ 
8L9T-V8KU]; Rachel Kahn Best, Linda Hamilton Krieger, Lauren B. Edelman & Scott R. Eliason, 
Multiple Disadvantages: An Empirical Test of Intersectionality Theory in EEO Litigation, 45 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 991, 994, 1018–19 (2011).  
 16.   See An Open Secret: Sexual Harassment at Work, ECONOMIST (Oct. 21, 2017), 
https://www.economist.com/international/2017/10/21/sexual-harassment-at-work [https://perma.cc 
/3785-CTZ3]. 
 17.   Rachel Arnow-Richman, Of Power and Process: Handling Harassers in an At-Will World, 
128 YALE L.J.F. 85, 87 (2018). 
 18.   Anne-Marie Slaughter, Sexual Harassment is Rooted in Power Imbalances, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 
26, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/1d624ee0-b8af-11e7-bff8-f9946607a6ba [https://perma.cc 
/ZF8V-24ZP] (detailing how gender inequality and workplace power distribution prevents the 
individual woman from speaking about her own sexual harassment). 
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victims of prominent figures into the limelight.19  In the legal realm, 
Supreme Court Justice Brett Kavanaugh faced many allegations of sexual 
assaults during his nomination and confirmation process.20  After Dr. 
Christine Blasey Ford accused Kavanaugh of sexual assault, other women 
came forward with similar experiences of Kavanaugh’s alleged 
inappropriate conduct.21  The Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing 
to determine the credibility of the women’s accusations against him.22  In 
light of the allegations, the American public became intensely divisive.  
Some argued that the Committee should believe Dr. Ford’s allegations and 
congressional members should recognize the inherent risk of coming 
forward to address an instance of sexual assault.23  Others argued the 
accusations lacked direct evidence and that the hearing was an attempt to 
smear the character of a potential Supreme Court Justice.24  While not 
governed by the Kansas evidentiary rules, Justice Kavanaugh’s 
nomination hearing contained many of the same arguments debated in the 
context of testimonial evidence offered to prove misconduct.  Under 
                                                          
 19.   David W. Garland, What does 2019 Have in Store for #MeToo?, HR DIVE (Dec. 5, 2018),  
https://www.hrdive.com/news/what-does-2019-have-in-store-for-metoo/543464/ [https://perma.cc/ 
M5U7-GWTG] (documenting the increase in sexual harassment claims brought to the EEOC in 2018). 
 20.   Seung Min Kim, Ann E. Marimow, Mike DeBonis & Elise Viebeck, Kavanaugh Hearing: 
Supreme Court Nominee Insists on His Innocence, Calls Process ‘National Disgrace’, WASH. POST 
(Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/kavanaugh-hearing-christine-blasey-ford-
to-give-senate-testimony-about-sexual-assault-allegation/2018/09/27/fc216170-c1c3-11e8-b338-
a3289f6cb742_story.html?utm_term=.91af626e313b [https://perma.cc/6PZ2-XXWZ] (summarizing 
the events of the Kavanagh hearing). 
 21.   Ronan Farrow & Jane Mayer, Senate Democrats Investigate a New Allegation of Sexual 
Misconduct, From Brett Kavanaugh’s College Years, NEW YORKER (Sept. 23, 2018), 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/senate-democrats-investigate-a-new-allegation-of-
sexual-misconduct-from-the-supreme-court-nominee-brett-kavanaughs-college-years-deborah-
ramirez [https://perma.cc/QZ6U-WVHQ] (providing an example of another credible allegation against 
Justice Kavanaugh). 
 22.   Seung Min Kim et al., supra note 20.  
 23.   See, e.g., Domenico Montanaro, Poll: More Believe Ford Than Kavanaugh, A Cultural Shift 
from 1991, NPR POLITICS (Oct. 3, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/10/03/654054108/poll-more-
believe-ford-than-kavanaugh-a-cultural-shift-from-1991 [https://perma.cc/2RT3-YXBH]; Nicole 
Brodeur, Why Should We Believe Christine Blasey Ford? It’s In the Details, SEATTLE TIMES (Sept. 
27, 2018) https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/why-should-we-believe-christine-blasey-ford-
its-in-the-details/ [https://perma.cc/3PYU-YGPU] (documenting evidence of support for Dr. Blasey 
Ford and her testimony).  
 24.   See, e.g., Allie Malloy, Kate Sullivan & Jeff Zeleny, Trump Mocks Christine Blasey Ford’s 
Testimony, Tells People to ‘Think of Your Son’, CNN POLITICS (Oct. 3, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/ 
2018/10/02/politics/trump-mocks-christine-blasey-ford-kavanaugh-supreme-court/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/8MRY-T5SS]; President Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Sept. 
27, 2018, 5:46 PM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1045444544068812800?ref_src=tw 
src%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1045444544068812800&ref_url=https%3
A%2F%2Fwww.haaretz.com%2Fus-news%2Fa-guide-to-the-ford-kavanaugh-hearing-1.6512344 
[https://perma.cc/LYF7-JQYH] (arguing Kavanaugh’s testimony was “powerful, honest, and riveting” 
and the hearing was “a total sham”). 
2019 IN THEIR WORDS 857 
K.S.A. § 60-455, testimony by other employees of discrimination or 
harassment not experienced by the plaintiff may be kept from the record 
for a number of reasons, even if the evidence may seem to provide logical 
validity to the plaintiff’s claim. 
This Note advocates for changes in the test used to determine what 
evidence is admitted under the Kansas Rules of Evidence under K.S.A. § 
60-455.  As the #MeToo movement continues to expose harassment and 
discrimination, the public will continue to pressure courts to acknowledge 
the systematic challenges faced by women in the employment context. 
Employment discrimination cases frequently hinge on the admission of 
circumstantial evidence to compensate for the rare presence of direct 
evidence.  When balancing the admission of “me too” evidence in a case 
of single-act employment discrimination, Kansas courts should 
consistently weigh the maximum potential probative impact against the 
minimum potential for prejudice and only exclude evidence when the 
prejudicial value substantially outweighs the probative value.  This Note 
will provide background for this argument by distinguishing between the 
#MeToo movement and “me too” testimony, articulating the rules 
currently used to determine the admissibility of evidence, and explain the 
function of the minimum-maximum (“min-max”) test.25 
II. BACKGROUND 
While the #MeToo movement has made a dramatic effect on society 
in the last few years, the term itself is not new to the legal claims of sexual 
harassment.  In cases of employment harassment and discrimination, 
plaintiffs often lack significant direct evidence to prove their civil 
claims.26  Because of this, circumstantial evidence has become 
increasingly important as employers become more aware of the risks and 
costs of explicit discrimination.27  In our modern economy, employers 
refrain from outwardly relying on identity-based differentiation and they 
will not admit to discriminatory intent.28  Therefore, the presence of direct 
                                                          
 25.   This Note will refer to the test that maximizes the potential probative value and minimizes 
the potential prejudicial value as the min-max test. 
 26.   See An Open Secret, supra note 16 (stating that in complaints of sexual harassment in the 
workplace, there is very rarely any kind of supporting evidence, hinging on a he said, she said 
discussion). 
 27.   See Sherie L. Coons, Proving Disparate Treatment After St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks: 
Is Anything Left of McDonnell Douglas, 19 J. CORP. L. 379, 381–82 (1994) (articulating the unique 
difficulties faced in employment discrimination cases). 
 28.   Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728, 731–32 (2011) 
(noting the market and social changes that have prompted the shift away from identity-based 
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evidence is becoming more scarce over time.  The term “me too” evidence 
is used to describe the testimony of employees who experienced the same 
or similar experiences to the plaintiff, but did not necessarily file 
independent claims of their own.29  In many cases, a supervisor may have 
discriminated against or harassed multiple employees.  The defendant will 
attempt to keep this testimonial evidence out and will likely file a motion 
in limine to exclude it.30  Not unlike the divided reaction to Kavanaugh’s 
appointment, courts have been divided in their use of “me too” evidence.31  
Some courts recognize the significant probative value that is provided by 
additional testimony32 while others believe including evidence beyond the 
isolated occurrence unfairly prejudices a jury against a defendant.33 
A. Weighing of “me too” evidence in federal law 
Because the admission of “me too” evidence in discrimination cases 
is so contentious, it is important to understand how the court determines 
whether such testimony should be included at trial.  At the federal level, 
courts operate using the Federal Rules of Evidence.  At the state level, each 
state has developed its own rules of evidence through statute—some closer 
to the federal rules than others.  The Federal Rules of Evidence are not 
always followed by individual states, but most will, at the very least, take 
the federal rules as strong persuasive authority.34  Therefore, even when 
evaluating a state’s evidence procedure, it is important to analyze how the 
federal courts have proceeded. 
In the context of “me too” evidence, the starting point for evidentiary 
analysis begins with Federal Rule of Evidence (Rule 401) which 
                                                          
differentiation). 
 29.   See David L. Gregory, Sprint/United Management Company v. Mendelsohn and Case-by-
Case Adjudication of “Me Too” Evidence of Discrimination, 102 N.W. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 382, 
385 (2008).  
 30.   See, e.g., Mendelsohn v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 466 F.3d 1223, 1225 (10th Cir. 2006), 
vacated, 552 U.S. 379 (2008); Cox v. Kan. City Chiefs Football Club, Inc., 473 S.W.3d 107, 113–14 
(Mo. 2015). 
 31.   Emily D. Wilson, Sprint/United Management Co. v. Mendelsohn: Tenth Circuit 
Employment Law Remains in “Me Too” Limbo, 63 OKLA. L. REV. 167, 172 (2010). 
 32.   See, e.g., Hawkins v. Hennepin Tech. Ctr., 900 F.2d 153, 156 (8th Cir. 1990); Spulak v. K 
Mart Corp., 894 F.2d 1150, 1156 (10th Cir. 1990). 
 33.   See, e.g., Wyvill v. United Cos. Life Ins. Co., 212 F.3d 296, 302–04 (5th Cir. 2000); Haskell 
v. Kaman Corp., 743 F.2d 113, 121 (2d Cir. 1984). 
 34.   Burton S. DeWitt, The Application and Construction of Rules of Admissibility in the Federal 
Rules of Evidence in Cases Where State Law Provides the Rule of Decision, 34 REV. LITIG. 283, 286 
(2015) (outlining the historical development of the Federal Rules of Evidence); See generally, Kenneth 
Graham, State Adaptation of the Federal Rules: The Pros and Cons, 43 OKLA. L. REV. 293 (1990).  
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determines the general test for relevance.35  This rule creates a low 
threshold for relevance.  Courts frequently interpret the phrase “any 
tendency to make a fact more or less probable” to mean that any evidence 
that provides a slight impact on the assessment of the probability of the 
claim is relevant.36  Most “me too” evidence is used by plaintiffs to help 
construct cases of discrimination.37  While testimony regarding other 
employer misconduct cannot fully prove a plaintiff’s claim, circumstantial 
evidence, such as previous harassment by the employer, seems to make it 
more probable.  Thus, most “me too” evidence likely meets the baseline 
test of relevance.38 
Additionally, “me too” evidence is frequently presented in the form of 
testimony regarding conduct, behavior, or character of employers.  The 
Federal Rules of Evidence provide specific limitations on character 
evidence in Rule 404.  Because of this, Rule 404(b) should be examined: 
(1) Prohibited Uses.  Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not 
admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a 
particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character. 
(2) Permitted Uses; Notice in a Criminal Case.  This evidence may be 
admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack 
of accident. . . .39 
The Federal Rules of Evidence generally prohibits character evidence, 
but Rule 404(b)(2) provides clear exceptions to the broad exclusion.40  
Motive, intent, and state of mind are all accepted purposes for admission 
and should be considered in the context of testimony of other 
discriminatory conduct by employers.41  Often, there are no issues raised 
at this stage. 
Finally, a court reviews the evidence in a Rule 403 balancing test.  
This rule favors admissibility and allows for factors such as “unfair 
prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting 
                                                          
 35.   FED. R. EVID. 401. 
 36.   JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE, § 
401.04[2][c] (2d ed. 1997). 
 37.   See Wilson, supra note 31, at 170. 
 38.   Nicholas C. Soltman, What About “Me (Too)”? The Case for Admitting Evidence of 
Discrimination Against Nonparties, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1875, 1900 (2009). 
 39.   FED. R. EVID. 404(b). 
 40.   Charles H. Rose III, Caging the Beast: Formulating Effective Evidentiary Rules to Deal with 
Sexual Offenders, 34 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 13 (2006). 
 41.   Lisa Marshall, The Character of Discrimination Law: The Incompatibility of Rule 404 and 
Employment Discrimination Suits, 114 YALE L.J. 1063, 1071, 1073 (2005). 
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time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence” to be weighed against 
the probative value of the evidence.42  When determining whether 
evidence should be admitted under Rule 403, a court may exclude relevant 
evidence only when these factors substantially outweigh the probative 
value of the evidence.  Executing a Rule 403 balancing test is more 
contentious than it might appear.  Courts have weighed the evidence using 
a number of factors over time to determine the probative and prejudicial 
impact of witness testimony. 
1. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn 
While it might seem reasonable that the Supreme Court would 
recognize this contentious issue and address the discrepancy, 
Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn sent a clear message that the 
Supreme Court was leaving this debate to the lower courts.  This federal 
case arose from a purported violation of the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634.43  Mendelsohn wanted 
to admit the “me too” testimony of five other employees who believed 
they were subject to discrimination and harassment based on their ages.44  
Mendelsohn’s case, like most employment discrimination cases, depended 
heavily on this evidence. 
The United States District Court for the District of Kansas excluded 
the “me too” testimonial evidence of the former employees, alleging 
discrimination by supervisors who had no role in the employment decision 
Mendelsohn challenged.45  The Court reasoned that these employees were 
not similarly situated because they did not have the same supervisor as 
Mendelsohn.46  Thus, the testimonial evidence was excluded.47 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit interpreted 
this exclusion as an inappropriately applied per se rule.48  The Court held 
that the per se exclusion of testimony was not proper based on an 
individual factor and then proceeded to conduct its own balancing test of 
                                                          
 42.   FED. R. EVID. 403; Amy S. Thomas, Utah Rule of Evidence 403 and Gruesome 
Photographs: Is a Picture Worth Anything in Utah?, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 1131, 1133 (1996). 
 43.   Mendelsohn v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., No. 03-2429-KHV, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30629 
(D. Kan. Nov. 29, 2004). 
 44.   See Wilson, supra note 31, at 181. 
 45.   Id. at 182. 
 46.   Mendelsohn v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 466 F.3d 1223, 1225 (10th Cir. 2006), vacated, 
552 U.S. 379 (2008). 
 47.   Id. 
 48.   Id. at 1226. 
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the testimony.49  The Court determined the testimony should be admitted 
under Rule 403, reversed the district court’s order denying Mendelsohn’s 
motion for a new trial, and remanded the case to the district court for 
further proceedings consistent with its opinion.50 
Upon appeal to the Supreme Court, Mendelsohn’s outcome became a 
highly anticipated answer to a circuit split that had developed wherein four 
circuits held that “me too” evidence was essentially irrelevant and 
therefore inadmissible.51  The Supreme Court held that the appellate courts 
must uphold Rule 403 rulings unless the district court has abused its 
discretion.52  Far from creating a clear standard, the Court held “such 
evidence is neither per se admissible nor per se inadmissible.”53  As 
explained in the subsequent sections of this Note, courts are now left to 
determine the admissibility of “me too” evidence on a case-by-case basis. 
2.  Application in Lower Courts 
On remand, the United States District Court for the District of Kansas 
responded to the Supreme Court’s Mendelsohn holding by providing 
factored reasons as to why “me too” evidence should be excluded from 
evidence.54  Since this ruling, the Supreme Court decision has begun to 
trickle down to the lower courts, which have interpreted the Mendelsohn 
holding in a variety of ways.  Courts have not pushed back on the 
Mendelsohn ruling, but instead have opted to construct factors and tests 
similar to the District of Kansas to evaluate the admissibility of “me too” 
evidence.  Courts have accepted that while Mendelsohn may not provide 
a clear standard of what to do, it is very clear on what not to do—base a 
decision on a singular factor.55 
At the federal trial court level, Hayes v. Sebelius demonstrates a 
typical manner in which trial courts have operated with the protection 
offered by Mendelsohn.56  In Hayes a number of factors are identified and 
each of them are evaluated to determine the probative value of the 
evidence.  Hayes used the following factors: “(1) whether past 
                                                          
 49.   Id. at 1231 (giving “the evidence its maximum reasonable probative force and its minimum 
reasonable prejudicial value” (notably identical to the proposed min-max test)). 
 50.   Id. 
 51.   Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 5, Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379 (No. 06-1221), 2007 WL 
738928, at *i (noting that “four circuits have held ‘me, too’ evidence wholly irrelevant”). 
 52.   Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379, 387–88 (2008). 
 53.   Id. at 381 (emphasis in original). 
 54.   Mendelsohn v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 587 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1217–20 (D. Kan. 2008). 
 55.   Griffin v. Finkbeiner, 689 F.3d 584, 598–600 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 56.   806 F. Supp. 2d 141, 144–45 (D.D.C. 2011). 
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discriminatory or retaliatory behavior is close in time to the events at issue 
in the case, (2) whether the same decisionmaker was involved, (3) whether 
the witness and plaintiff were treated in the same manner, and (4) whether 
the witness and plaintiff were otherwise similarly situated.”57  It is relevant 
to note that Hayes still asks each of these questions—it does not base its 
determination on a singular factor. 
At the appellate level, Calobrisi v. Booz Allen Hamilton, Inc. 
demonstrates an example of a remand performed when “the district court 
did not individually analyze each piece of other employee evidence. . . .”58  
Before Mendelsohn, a court at the appellate level may have evaluated the 
“me too” evidence.  But in Calobrisi, the court followed the Mendelsohn 
approach and remanded the case without weighing the probative and 
prejudicial factors for the trial court.59  The court rearticulated the factors 
the trial court could use to evaluate the evidence, but ultimately allowed 
the trial court to be the final gatekeeper of the evidence.60  So, after 
Mendelsohn, courts were left right where they had started—fighting about 
admission to the trial court. 
III. THE MINIMUM-MAXIMUM TEST 
While not an issue in Mendelsohn, courts use several different tests to 
determine the probative and prejudicial weight of evidence.  Judge 
Weinstein and Professor Margaret Berger’s treatise on evidence describes 
one such Rule 403 test.61  Under the Weinstein/Berger approach, the 
applicable test for Rule 403 is to “look at the evidence in a light most 
favorable to its proponent, maximizing its probative value and minimizing 
its prejudicial effect.”62  This is known as the min-max test.63  In addition, 
the Editorial Explanatory Comment of the Federal Rules of Evidence 
Manual has recognized this test as preferable to tests that place a 
maximized value on prejudicial impact.64  This test is reflective of the 
liberal nature of Rule 403, which imposes a steep burden to overcome the 
                                                          
 57.   Id. (emphasis added). 
 58.   660 F. App’x 207, 210 (4th Cir. 2016). 
 59.   Id. 
 60.   Id. at 209–10. 
 61.   JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE MANUAL § 6.02 
(7th ed. 2005). 
 62.   Leah Tabbert, Note, Maximizing the Min-Max Test: A Proposal To Unify the Framework 
for Rule 403 Decisions, 100 MINN. L. REV. 2217, 2217–18 (2016).  
 63.   Id. at 2217. 
 64.   STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL., FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL § 403.02[2] 
(Matthew Bender 11th ed. 2018). 
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presumption that a court should admit the evidence.65  At its core, Rule 
403 prevents the extremities of potential jury decisions and protects these 
decisions from the dangers of prejudice.66  The min-max test for 
determining how probative and prejudicial values should be weighed 
recognizes the value of jury independence and discretion.67  Instead of 
placing the burden on the judge to filter the evidence for the jury, this 
interpretation considers the jury capable of forming justified 
conclusions.68 
This test is widely used by courts to weigh the probative and 
prejudicial value of evidence.  In fact, it has been implemented in the 
Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits.69  
Some of these circuits consistently apply this test when considering 
appeals of admitted evidence.70  Other circuits (including the Tenth) have 
used “the min-max test as a duty of the trial court as well as the appellate 
court.”71  Because the rule offers a greater chance for admission, the 
majority of federal circuits have used this test as a method of review at the 
appellate level to allow trial court discretion.72  This Note advocates for 
the application of this test at the trial court and appellate levels to extend 
this discretion to the jury.73 
While typically employed during appellate review, the min-max test 
is easily operable at the trial court level.  Kansas Appellate Courts would 
still have the ability to review for abuse of discretion if Kansas courts 
adopted the min-max test.  Additionally, applying the min-max test to the 
trial court avoids a major issue that occurs when only appellate courts 
apply the test.  On one hand, as established, Rule 403 and K.S.A. § 60-445 
both have a strong presumption of admission74 as both require that the 
probative value be substantially outweighed by the negative factors.75  On 
the other, a trial court possesses a significant level of discretion in 
                                                          
 65.   David Crump, On the Uses of Irrelevant Evidence, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (1997). 
 66.   Tabbert, supra note 62, at 2223–24. 
 67.   See id. at 2223. 
 68.   Id. 
 69.   See Tabbert, supra note 62, at 2229. 
 70.   Id. at 2230. 
 71.   Id. at 2231; Deters v. Equifax Credit Info. Servs., Inc., 202 F.3d 1262, 1274 (10th Cir. 2000). 
 72.   Tabbert, supra note 62, at 2220. 
 73.   See id. at 2239, 2250 (noting the tensions between Rule 402’s exclusion of evidence from 
the jury while recognizing the right to trial by jury and advocating for amendment to Rule 403 to bind 
trial and appellate courts to the min-max test). 
 74.   Christopher M. Joseph, Other Misconduct Evidence: Rethinking Kansas Statutes Annotated 
Section 60-455, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 145, 190 (2000) (examining the legislative history of K.S.A. § 60-
445, which stems from Model Rule 55 prior to the creation of the Federal Rules of Evidence).  
 75.   FED. R. EVID. 403; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-445 (2005). 
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determining what evidence is admitted to the record because it possesses 
a superior position to evaluate the circumstances.76  These two 
presumptions clash when an appellate court (using the min-max test) 
reviews a trial court’s (using traditional test) exclusion of evidence.77  The 
min-max test, by definition, necessarily increases the evaluated probative 
value of the evidence and decreases its evaluated prejudicial value.78  
Because the min-max test heightens consideration of the probative value 
of evidence, it is possible—even probable—that appellate courts will find 
the maximum potential probative value of evidence is not substantially 
outweighed by minimized prejudicial impact in a circumstance where the 
trial court has not adjusted the probative and prejudicial weight of the 
evidence.79  In this case, the presumption to admit the evidence and trial 
court’s discretion come to head.80  By adopting the test at both the trial and 
appellate level, Kansas courts will avoid this issue and be able to allow 
trial courts discretion while also discouraging unnecessary exclusions.81 
Critics of the test argue for a narrower reading of Rule 403 and note 
that the rule is intended to shield a jury from evidence that may cause it to 
rule in error.82  That said, a prerequisite to application of Rule 403 or 
K.S.A. § 60-445 is proof of relevance.83  Because courts are necessarily 
excluding relevant evidence, many courts have noted that the rule should 
be used sparingly.84  Although applying the min-max test may limit the 
frequency judges use K.S.A. § 60-445 to exclude evidence, this limitation 
aligns precisely with the intent of the rule.  Regardless, even when the min-
max test is used in application to K.S.A. § 60-445, there are litanies of 
other protections offered by the rest of evidentiary rules that can check a 
dangerous expansion of evidence.85 
                                                          
 76.   JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 
403.02[2][d] (2d ed. 1997) (citing Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379, 387–88 
(2008)). 
 77.   Tabbert, supra note 62, at 2242–43. 
 78.   Id. at 2217. 
 79.   Id. at 2242. 
 80.   Id. 
 81.   Id. at 2250. 
 82.   Id. at 2218. 
 83.   FED. R. EVID. 403; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-445 (giving the judge discretion to exclude 
evidence that is otherwise admissible). 
 84.   See United States v. Hogan, 253 F. App’x 889, 896 (11th Cir. 2007); United States v. Morris, 
79 F.3d 409, 412 (5th Cir. 1996); State v. Seacat, 366 P.3d 208, 221 (Kan. 2016) (“Kansas law favors 
the admission of otherwise relevant evidence, and the exclusion of relevant evidence is an 
extraordinary remedy that should be used sparingly.”) (citing State v. Carr, 331 P.3d 544, 683–84 
(Kan. 2014)). 
 85.   See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-447 (2005) (limiting the use of character evidence); KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 60-451 (2005) (prohibiting the use of evidence of remedial measures to prove negligence 
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This test provides a unique advantage when evaluating the potential 
impact of evidence—particularly in the employment setting.  Rule 403 has 
been viewed as so broad “the rule could be applied to support almost any 
result.”86  When determining what is considered prejudicial value, the 
Federal Rules of Evidence Manual says, “prejudicial evidence is any 
evidence that affects the trier of fact in a manner not attributable to the 
permissible probative force of the evidence.”87  To determine the probative 
value, a judge must determine how well the evidence supports a material 
fact and how central that fact is to the overall claim.88  A judge should 
determine whether a particular piece of evidence is relevant, but narrowly 
construing the role of the judge in excluding evidence is critical to prevent 
judges from assessing credibility.89  Rule 403 necessarily involves a level 
of discretion when determining the weight of the probative and prejudicial 
impact.  The min-max test creates a much more predictable result by 
consistently increasing the probative value of the evidence.  This 
predictability can aid parties in the pre-trial process, judges in deliberation, 
and appeals courts upon question. 
IV. KANSAS’S RULE OF PREJUDICIAL INADMISSIBILITY 
Kansas courts have applied K.S.A. § 60-445, using a probative-
prejudice evaluation to determine admissibility.90  This standard for the 
Kansas rule is not as clear-cut as Rule 403.  Often, courts hold evidence 
inadmissible when “more prejudicial than probative . . . pursuant to 
K.S.A. § 60-445.”91  However, these courts have not consistently applied 
this standard when weighing the probative and prejudicial values.  Each 
level of Kansas courts have applied the test using different thresholds.  
Sometimes, a court articulates the standard as allowing exclusion when 
probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice.92  Other 
                                                          
or culpable conduct); FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee’s note (Each of the Article IV Rules are 
intended to be “concrete applications [of rules 402 and 403] evolved for particular situations.”). 
 86.   Tabbert, supra note 62, at 2233. 
 87.   SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 64, at § 403.02[3].  
 88.   See Tabbert, supra note 62, at 2234. 
 89.   Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Meaning of Probative Value and Prejudice in Federal Rule of 
Evidence 403: Can Rule 403 Be Used to Resurrect the Common Law of Evidence?, 41 VAND. L. REV. 
879, 887 (1988). 
 90.   Ratterree v. Bartlett, 707 P.2d 1063, 1069 (Kan. 1985). 
 91.   Id. See also State v. Trotter, 127 P.3d 972, 980 (Kan. 2006). 
 92.   See State v. Lowrance, 312 P.3d 328, 341 (Kan. 2013) (misstating the rule in State v. Reid, 
186 P.3d 713, 721 (Kan. 2008)); State v. Marks, 298 P.3d 1102, 1113 (Kan. 2013); State v. Mitchell, 
179 P.3d 394, 397 (Kan. 2008); State v. Davis, 515 P.2d 802, 805 (Kan. 1973); State v. Rodman, 383 
P.3d 187, 194 (Kan. Ct. App. 2016). 
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times, courts require the prejudice to outweigh the probative value—
removing the substantial requirement.93  In Ratterree v. Bartlett, the 
Kansas Supreme Court effectively wrote prejudicial value into the rule 
holding, “the trial court correctly ruled the evidence of the smell of alcohol 
on Hernandez’ breath would be more prejudicial than probative and 
correctly excluded the evidence.”94  However, likely because of the varied 
text of K.S.A. § 60-445, the application has been inconsistent. 
Kansas does not operate under the Federal Rules of Evidence, but 
courts often use the Rules as persuasive authority when the Kansas 
evidentiary rules create a question of interpretation.95  As noted above, 
K.S.A. § 60-445 creates one such gap—clearly demonstrated by the 
inconsistent application of K.S.A. § 60-445.96  There are clear and 
significant differences between Rule 403 and K.S.A. § 60-445.97  First, the 
two rules have significant textual differences.  Rule 403 provides a clear 
standard to evaluate the probative and prejudicial value of evidence.  Rule 
403 says, “The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value 
is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: 
unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, 
wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”98 
K.S.A. § 60-445, on the other hand, reads: 
Except as in this article otherwise provided, the judge may in his or her 
discretion exclude evidence if he or she finds that its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the risk that its admission will unfairly and 
harmfully surprise a party who has not had reasonable opportunity to 
anticipate that such evidence would be offered.99 
At first glance, these two rules contain very similar wording.  Both the 
Kansas rule and Rule 403 require a court to weigh the probative value of 
admitting evidence.100  Additionally, both include the phrase 
“substantially outweigh.”101  It is important to note, though, that the 
                                                          
 93.   See State v. Decker, 202 P.3d 669, 673 (Kan. 2009); State v. Wells, 221 P.3d 561, 568 (Kan. 
2009); Reid, 186 P.3d at 721; State v. Trotter, 127 P.3d 972, 980 (Kan. 2006); State v. Herzog, 2001 
Kan. App. Unpub. LEXIS 551, at *7–8 (Kan. Ct. App. Sept. 7, 2001). 
 94.   Ratterree, 707 P.2d at 1069 (citing K.S.A. § 60-445). 
 95.   See, e.g., Reid, 186 P.3d at 722 (recognizing and comparing the Federal Rule to its “Kansas 
counterpart”); Smart v. BNSF Ry. Co., 369 P.3d 966, 973 (Kan. Ct. App. 2016) (finding that the 
federal rules should be used as persuasive authority to interpret similar rules). 
 96.   See cases cited supra notes 92–93. 
 97.   See FED. R. EVID. 403; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-445. 
 98.   FED. R. EVID. 403. 
 99.   KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-445. 
 100.   See FED. R. EVID. 403; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-445. 
 101.   Id. 
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Kansas rule does not expressly require courts to evaluate the “prejudicial” 
damage that evidence may create.102  The Kansas rule was written to 
prevent evidence that would “unfairly and harmfully surprise a party.”103  
This demonstrates a clear textual  difference between the two.  In fact, the 
committee notes for the Federal Rules of Evidence contrast the inclusion 
of “surprise” in the Kansas statute with the purposeful exclusion within 
the federal rules.104  Based on the text of the Kansas statute standing alone, 
the standard for admitting evidence does not require the balancing of 
prejudicial impact outside a potential for surprise. 
However, as noted above, courts have generally concluded that 
prejudicial value should be weighed in determining whether the evidence 
is admitted under K.S.A. § 60-445.105  More conclusively, in State v. Lee, 
the Kansas Supreme Court decided that the progression of common law 
(specifically the Ratterree v. Bartlett decision) effectively placed “unfair 
prejudice” in K.S.A. § 60-445, making the statute comparable to Rule 403 
and other equivalent state statutes.106  The Kansas Supreme Court adopted 
the reasoning of the federal case Old Chief v. United States and found “no 
distinction between Federal Rule 403 and K.S.A. [§] 60-445 based on the 
absence from § 60-445 of the phrase ‘unfair prejudice.’”107 
V. ANALYSIS 
The Kansas Supreme Court should require the min-max test to be 
applied at the trial and appellate levels when evaluating the admission of 
evidence under K.S.A. § 60-445.  Kansas courts have applied its 
prejudicial inadmissibility in numerous ways—none of which are textually 
true to the written rule.  State v. Lee adopted the reasoning of Old Chief 
and incorporated prejudice into K.S.A. § 60-445, but was silent on how to 
properly weigh the prejudicial impact and probative value.108  If courts 
apply the min-max test, the probative value of “me too” evidence would 
be considered at its maximum value and its prejudicial impacts minimized, 
increasing the likelihood of its admission. 
Kansas courts’ application of the test in “me too” cases is uniquely 
important for several reasons.  The Kansas Supreme Court has a direct 
interest in the efficiency and effectiveness of trials.  By consistently 
                                                          
 102.   See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-445. 
 103.   Id. 
 104.   See FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee’s note to 2011 amendment. 
 105.   See supra notes 92–93. 
 106.   977 P.2d 263, 269 (Kan. 1999). 
 107.   Id. at 270.  
 108.   Id. 
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applying the min-max test, a court can make the admissibility more 
predictable while also ensuring the proper evaluation of relevant evidence.  
More significantly, courts that apply the min-max test will compensate for 
the systemic disadvantage that employees face in cases of employment 
discrimination.  While employees face an uphill battle in discrimination 
and harassment claims, the min-max test will increase the likelihood that 
courts will admit evidence that is critical to their case for jury 
consideration.  Employees in “me too” scenarios face burdens to getting 
cases to trial, establishing concrete evidence, finding testimony identical 
to their own harassment, and are often contractually forced to isolate 
personal claims.  Each of these barriers hampers the potential for victims 
of sexual harassment to be compensated for workplace conduct.  While 
this inclusion of evidence could increase the potential that courts could 
admit false testimony, testimony can be independently attacked for 
credibility and evaluated by the jury. 
A. Trial Effectiveness and Efficiency 
In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, the 
Supreme Court unanimously said, “individuals who testified about their 
personal experiences with the company brought the cold numbers 
convincingly to life.”109  It is almost undeniable that personal accounts of 
sexual harassment and discrimination have more practical significance 
than numbers, statistics, or even recited facts of similar experiences.  
Allowing testimony into trial will encourage a more full and transparent 
view of the issue at hand.  If the Kavanaugh hearing demonstrates any 
positive social implications, it is the importance of engaging in face-to-
face discussion.  Hearing from a real person is significantly different from 
second-hand information or statistics. 
This is not to say that every witness will be believed.  An important 
part about this change in evidentiary rules is that it allows the information 
to reach the decision maker—including evidence provided by the 
defendant.  Allowing both sides to develop arguments fully will ensure the 
jury will be able to make a decision that is based on a full presentation of 
information. 
Not only does the testimony improve the evidentiary quality of the 
trial, it also has the ability to improve judicial efficiency.  Using the evenly 
balanced Rule 403 standard of review, courts are forced to accurately 
predict and assess the actual probative and prejudicial value of the 
                                                          
 109.   431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977). 
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evidence in question.  Because this frequently renders close decisions, 
courts have chosen to deny motions in limine and hold an evidentiary 
hearing later.110  Unfortunately, this is not effective for any of the parties 
involved.  When attempting to settle or prepare for trial, the parties are 
unaware of whether extremely relevant evidence will make it into the 
courtroom.111  This also can add additional time to litigation, as the parties 
have to debate what gets to come into trial.  Allowing the jury to hear 
evidence from both sides at trial would help both parties accurately predict 
and assess their costs for pursuing litigation. 
B. Courts’ Application of the Min-Max Test Addresses Procedural 
Disadvantages Faced by Employees 
If Kansas courts adopt the broader min-max test, it could have 
significant impacts on the ability of employees to seek action against 
employers in harassment and discrimination suits.  This is not simply to 
address a social issue.  By adopting this broader interpretation and test, 
Kansas courts can address procedural disadvantages such as pretrial 
barriers, access to legal remedies, lack of direct evidence, and additional 
barriers faced by people with intersecting identities.  Plaintiffs in 
employment discrimination cases have comparatively lower rates of relief 
than other cases.112  It is not a question of whether harassment or 
discrimination is occurring—as addressed above, we know that is true.113  
The problem is that we often only talk about sexual harassment and 
discrimination as isolated actions against the individual.114  This is not a 
fair assessment of what has occurred.  Sexual harassment and 
discrimination in the workplace inherently involve the power dynamic 
created by employment.  Individuals that occupy positions of power often 
have different levels of employment security as well, decreasing the 
chance a company will take action.115  As we have seen from the “Me Too” 
                                                          
 110.   See, e.g., Miller v. Love’s Travel Stops & Country Stores, Inc., No. CIV-06-1008-D, 2008 
WL 2079961, at *2 (W.D. Okla. May 9, 2008). 
 111.   See, e.g., Jones v. UPS, No. 06-2143-KHV, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24772 (D. Kan. Mar. 
27, 2008). 
 112.   Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard To Win?, 61 LA. L. 
REV. 555, 557–61 (2001). 
 113.   See supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text. 
 114.   See Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, Again, 128 YALE L.J.  F. 27, 
33–34 (2018) (challenging the traditional “predatory sexuality” theory of sexual harassment and 
arguing instead that sexual harassment is more about power dynamics, masculinity, and sex-based 
hostility). 
 115.   See generally Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of CEO 
Employment Contracts: What Do Top Executives Bargain For?, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 231, 233 
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era, when men occupy positions of power, there is a significant risk that 
the women beneath them are defenseless.  It is critical to look at the larger 
issue of how employees are situated in relation to employers and the 
structural barriers that must be overcome to address these issues. 
To illustrate these issues, consider a hypothetical involving a low-
level senior Black woman terminated after enduring weeks of on-the-job 
harassment.  For purposes of this hypothetical, assume that the direct male 
supervisor made blatantly sexist and racist remarks and openly discussed 
the burden that older employees place on business operations amongst 
other high-level male supervisors.  There is no written or recorded 
evidence of any of the supervisor’s conduct, but multiple lower-level 
employees have also witnessed and experienced either sexist, racist, or 
ageist harassment.  Our employee previously filed a complaint with HR 
and now wants to pursue legal action.  This fairly typical example of 
employment discrimination will demonstrate some key issues faced by 
victims of workplace harassment and the importance of applying the min-
max test in cases of “me too” testimony. 
The first problem an employee faces that makes this change in rules 
especially important is the barriers she must overcome to reach trial.  The 
California Department of Fair Employment and Housing (the 
“Department”) acts as a magnified illustration of this issue.  In 2017, the 
Department investigated 6,160 complaints and filed only thirty-five 
lawsuits in court.116  In many cases, employees that are potential witnesses 
may provide relevant probative evidence that remains unreported solely 
because of corporate attempts to suppress accusations.117  Employers, 
especially corporate employers, possess a large information imbalance.  
Besides their access to records and office information, they also frequently 
control the manner and process of reporting.  In our hypothetical, the 
employer would have regulated the manner in which the employee filed 
her HR complaint, had access to all internal communications, and during 
litigation would be able to view and compare other complaints issued by 
other employees.  This information disparity places victims of sexual 
                                                          
(2006) (noting that CEOs frequently bargain for and obtain some measure of job security, avoiding 
the general principle of at-will employment). 
 116.   DEP’T FAIR EMP. & HOUSING, ST. OF CAL., 2017 ANN. REP. 7 (2017), 
https://www.dfeh.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/32/2018/08/DFEH-AnnualReport-2017.pdf 
(Contextually, the DFEH received 24,779 complaints in 2017). 
 117.   See Susan J. Fowler, Reflecting On One Very, Very Strange Year At Uber, SUSAN J. FOWLER 
BLOG (Feb. 19, 2017), https://www.susanjfowler.com/blog/2017/2/19/reflecting-on-one-very-
strange-year-at-uber [https://perma.cc/79GN-XZBW] (relating the author’s experience while working 
at Uber where HR repeatedly dismissed female employees’ complaints of sexual harassment against 
the same manager as “his first offense.”). 
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harassment at a unique disadvantage that can deter or dissuade an 
employee from pursuing a claim. 
Additionally, employers hold the inherent advantage of economic 
power.  Employers typically classify low-level employees at-will, placing 
their economic liberties at risk.118  Because other employees may fear the 
economic ramifications of testifying against the employer, evidence is 
significantly more difficult for a plaintiff to obtain.  While some retaliation 
protections exist,119 reporting an employer’s misconduct is especially 
difficult for both the plaintiff and the corroborating witness as “both exit 
and voice are costly and constrained for workers.”120  Because the 
employer controls day-to-day operations as well as long-term 
employment, the risk of vocalizing the mistreatment is high.  In our 
hypothetical, our plaintiff may have endured discrimination in fear of 
termination, and now must convince other employees to provide testimony 
(for little-to-no personal gain) and risk their own economic stability.  Our 
now-unemployed plaintiff must exhaust personal resources including time 
and potentially high financial expenses to compete with the multitude of 
corporate resources while also encouraging other employees to risk 
termination by providing testimony.  Once other employees come forward 
to corroborate the harassment experience of the plaintiff, it only seems 
fitting that the court provide a lenient test to determine whether evidence 
can even make it to the jury. 
Second, in many cases, individuals experience contractual issues that 
make their access to legal remedies more difficult.  In larger companies, 
trends of sexual harassment and discrimination may root deep in policy, 
often found in clauses that forbid employees in engaging in class action 
lawsuits against the company.121  The significance of this will only 
continue to grow.  The Supreme Court recently held in Epic Systems 
Corporation v. Lewis that these waivers of class action rights were 
                                                          
 118.   Richard A. Bales, Explaining the Spread of At-Will Employment as an Interjurisdictional 
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872 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 67 
acceptable under the National Labor Relations Act.122  In Justice 
Ginsburg’s dissent she argues, “concerted legal actions have played a 
critical role in enforcing prohibitions against workplace discrimination 
based on race, sex, and other protected characteristics.”123  This ruling 
allows companies to shift women away from the courtroom.  As the “Me 
Too” era has demonstrated, women feel empowered to come forward with 
other women.  Thus, while our hypothetical employee may have been 
comfortable joining a class action against the employer, the Epic Systems 
holding further isolates plaintiffs and removes their strength in numbers.  
The min-max test acts to ameliorate negative impact of the no-class-action 
ruling and allows plaintiffs to retain a significant litigation tool. 
The isolation of harassment claims also creates a larger social issue.  
When employees are not able to come together in class action suits, 
employers may never address company-wide issues.  Empirical research 
demonstrates that “entities necessarily shape the context in which 
individuals act and interact and that they accordingly drive behavior” of 
the seemingly isolated individuals within an organization.124  When courts 
conceptualize suits as isolated individualized occurrences, women are 
forced to win a war against discrimination and harassment using a strategy 
of death by a thousand cuts.125  Even if successful, our isolated 
hypothetical lawsuit will not likely change the workplace culture, nor will 
it necessarily embolden other people to pursue isolated claims.  However, 
if women are consistently able to testify for other women about their 
experiences in the workplace, the justice system may be able to 
compensate for this loss of potential recourse.  Having a test that 
consistently allows “me too” evidence into trial is important to ensure 
women know that providing their name and getting involved in the process 
is worth the risk. 
This poses an interesting predicament for those that argue men are 
being subjected to excessive disciplinary action.  Rank-and-file employees 
often do not benefit from the same power dynamic as high-level employers 
and are instead vulnerable to systemic disciplinary scapegoating.126  In a 
work culture of HR trainings, strategic procedural changes, conveniently-
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timed disciplinary actions, lower-level employees are more likely to be 
subjected to unfair discipline in the process of shielding higher-level 
employees from suits.127  In contrast to rank employees, higher-level 
employees frequently bargain for protection from termination and cannot 
be fired unless the harassment or discrimination is classified as 
“extreme”—a designation implicated by the potential for multiple 
violations.128  If the unjust discipline of less-protected parties indeed 
concerns a court, allowing additional testimony would force solutions to 
address top-down solutions to systemic problems as opposed to treating 
the symptoms of the organization.  In our hypothetical, it is very realistic 
that the sexist, racist, and ageist discussions among supervisors may be 
indicative of a higher-level issue.  Applying the min-max test in cases of 
employment discrimination would account for this corporate dynamic and 
recognize the potential probative value “me too” evidence can provide 
when assessing cases of sexual harassment and discrimination. 
Third, when discussing issues of employment discrimination, the 
Supreme Court has not hesitated to recognize a plaintiff’s lack of access 
to direct evidence.129  In cases of harassment and discrimination, cases 
often come down to circumstantial evidence.  Even if the harassment is 
repetitious and apparent, cases involving workplace misconduct often 
involve verbal exchanges or personal interactions.  These do not usually 
solidify into concrete evidence—leaving employees without evidence to 
support their case.130  This is certainly true in our hypothetical where our 
employee has experienced clear harassment but has no concrete evidence 
to present to a court.  This has only become truer over time as employers 
are increasingly aware of the importance of not leaving concrete evidence 
of discrimination.131  Our hypothetical employee would be extremely 
fortunate (for lack of better terms) if her employer were to send a harassing 
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email or text.  Unfortunately, “me too” evidence is often the only type of 
evidence that is available to develop a credible case—even in cases 
involving company-wide harassment or discrimination.132  When applying 
the min-max test, the maximized weight of probative value would be 
reflective of this fact and remedy the disparity in evidence possession. 
Historically, some have argued the prejudicial impact of “me too” 
testimony is significantly greater than the probative value of the 
evidence.133  Because the testimony inevitably combines elements of 
emotion and circumstance, opponents assert that defendants often face 
disproportionate consequences.134  However, an important consideration 
is whether the prejudice that occurs is unfair.  Because cases of workplace 
harassment and discrimination usually require broader workplace 
inquiries, multiple instances of similar conduct may suggest an intent, 
motive, or knowledge of discrimination at the institutional level.135  So 
while it may be true that circumstantial evidence is prejudicial, this does 
not mean it is unfairly so. 
Furthermore, even assuming a clear balancing test for admission, the 
estimation of actual (as opposed to potential) probative value of 
circumstantial evidence can prove problematic.  Weighing the evidence 
requires on-the-spot balancing of probative value and prejudicial impact 
and each piece of evidence may come at different stages of a suit.136  In 
Old Chief v. United States (as noted above, Kansas adopted this reasoning 
in State v. Lee), the Supreme Court articulates the scope of considerations 
to be considered when calculating probative and prejudicial values.137  
When determining admission, a court should consider not only the value 
of the independent evidence, but also the role the evidence plays in 
conjunction with other pieces of evidence in the record.138  If K.S.A. § 60-
445 were applied in either manner currently used by the State’s courts, this 
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would create a unique problem in cases involving “me too” evidence.  As 
noted in Mendelsohn, the value of “me too” testimony, is not inherent 
within the evidence, but instead requires a context-specific inquiry.139  The 
Court in Old Chief says that courts should incorporate the scarcity of 
evidence into a calculation of probative value.140  Because employment 
discrimination and harassment cases often have little evidence outside of 
circumstantial “me too” testimony, a judge would be forced to either 
functionally weigh the evidence independently, or weigh testimony 
against potential, currently unoffered evidence. 
Fourth, employees with claims that involve multiple (intersecting) 
forms of discrimination face additional barriers in developing evidentiary 
basis that has significant implications for case viability.  An 
interdisciplinary statistical study of workplace discrimination claims filed 
by those with overlapping ascriptive characteristics found that “those who 
assert two or more types of discrimination fare worse than do those whose 
cases [do not].”141  Because individuals with intersecting identities (such 
as Black women, senior women, or our hypothetical senior Black woman) 
may not be able to find other employees with identical experiences, these 
employees require the testimony of a larger number of employees that 
experienced similar, but not the same, discrimination or harassment.142  
For example, our hypothetical senior woman of color may require three 
separate testimonies if there is not an employee who is also a senior 
woman of color who also experienced discrimination.  In these cases, the 
isolated probative value of an individual’s testimony is unquestionably 
somewhat lower than the testimony of a non-plaintiff witness who 
experienced discrimination along one axis of identity.  If courts view the 
testimony of these individual witnesses through an unadjusted test, it is 
possible the prejudicial impact of these individuals’ testimony will 
outweigh its probative value.  Mendelsohn requires courts to analyze the 
similarity in experience between the testimony of a third-party when 
determining probative value while also evaluating the independent 
                                                          
 139.   Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379, 387–88 (2008). 
 140.   Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 184. 
 141.   Rachel Kahn Best et al., Multiple Disadvantages: An Empirical Test of Intersectionality 
Theory in EEO Litigation, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 991, 1019 (2011).  See also, Emma Reece Denny, 
Mo’ Claims Mo’ Problems: How Courts Ignore Multiple Claimants in Employment Discrimination 
Litigation, 30 LAW & INEQ. 339, 355 (2012) (citing, among other statistics, that 7.5% of multiple-
claim plaintiffs make it past the summary judgment stage as opposed to 30.3% of single-claim 
plaintiffs.). 
 142.   Minna J. Kotkin, Diversity and Discrimination: A Look at Complex Bias, 50 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1439, 1491 (2009). 
876 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 67 
prejudicial impact of that testimony.143  In this hypothetical, each provides 
only a third of the facts necessary for the plaintiff to establish her case, but 
at the same time, each independently represents an independent case of 
discriminatory action by the defendant. 
Historically, employers have covertly used intersection of identities to 
isolate and discriminate.144  Kimberle Crenshaw identifies one such 
example.  In Degraffenreid v. GM Assembly Division, a company which 
refused to hire Black women until 1964, conveniently conducted a series 
of “last hired-first fired” seniority-based lay-offs.145  When analyzing the 
result of this lay-off, white women and Black men both retained their 
employment providing statistical data demonstrating a lack of racial and 
gender discrimination.146  Because of this, the U.S. District Court for the 
Eastern District of Missouri granted summary judgment in the case and 
determined there was no evidence of racial or gender discrimination.147  
While the outcome in today’s society would likely not be as extreme as 
Crenshaw’s example, it is important to recognize the significant impact 
these decisions can have.  For many employees, economic dependence on 
a discriminatory employer is day-to-day reality.  Giving juries access to 
information is critical to allowing public citizens to check these social 
imbalances. 
While it may be possible to establish a pattern of discrimination, this 
may not always be the case, as shown by a recent Missouri Supreme Court 
decision involving a similar issue.  In Cox v. Kansas City Chiefs Football 
Club, an employer moved to exclude evidence of seventeen non-similarly 
situated former employees whom Mr. Cox might call to testify.148  The 
trial court excluded the evidence because the plaintiff had not alleged a 
pattern-or-practice of discrimination and the testifying employees were 
each positioned differently than Cox in relation to the employer.149  
However, on appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court held that each instance 
of “me too” testimony should be subject to an individualized balancing of 
probativeness and prejudice and should not be rejected in a blanket 
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ruling.150  In weighing the individual instances of “me too” evidence, the 
Court held that legal relevance must be determined by the presence of 
logical relevance.151  Logical relevance is not determined by defined 
requirements, but rather a case-by-case evaluation as “[t]here is no one set 
of agreed-upon factors, and no one factor is dispositive.”152  Therefore, 
when determining whether “me too” evidence should be included, a court 
must look at similarities and assess the probative value of evidence and 
not simply assess the distinguishing features of testimony. 
This reasoning is particularly relevant when looking at how Kansas 
courts should determine admission of “me too” evidence.  Functionally, 
the Cox decision minimized the strict scrutinizing of testimonial variance 
and focused the consideration on whether or not the individualized 
testimony offers isolated logical similarities.  In the same way, minimizing 
the prejudicial value of testimony would prevent a court from emphasizing 
distinguishable variances, while maximizing probative value would 
instead shift the discussion to isolated similarities. 
Each of the independent barriers poses a unique problem for those who 
experience sexual harassment.  Getting a claim to the courtroom requires 
plaintiffs to overwhelm a litany of obstacles that magnify the risk of 
speaking out against sexual harassment.  When a court has determined that 
evidence has met the burden of relevance, a test that errs on the side of 
magnifying potential probative value encourages plaintiffs to attempt to 
surmount these obstacles in scenarios of sexual harassment and 
discrimination. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Society’s perception and handling of sexual harassment and 
discrimination claims has changed drastically over the last three decades.  
As the #MeToo movement indicates, though, sexual harassment is an 
extremely prevalent problem that employers are failing to address 
properly.  As the private sector continues to adjust to these changes, it is 
important the legal system recognizes and adapts to the needs of 
disadvantaged populations.  Independently, Kansas’s evidentiary law 
requires a clear interpretation of K.S.A. § 60-445.  Courts have the ability 
to encourage effective and efficient trials that flush out systemic 
discrimination and hidden harassment.  If Kansas courts require the 
minimized prejudicial value of “me too” evidence to substantially 
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outweigh the maximized probative value, the voices of the #MeToo 
movement will have the opportunity to make it into a courtroom.  Kansas 
can only expect true justice if it allows these testimonies to be heard. 
 
